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War Criminals: Real and Imagined  

by Gregory Elich 

Centre for Research on Globalisation (CRG),  globalresearch.ca   18 November 2001

The blare of media fanfare exhorts us to celebrate the abduction and imprisonment of former Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic. Though widely touted as a victory in the American crusade for human rights, the arrest of Milosevic fits a quite different pattern when seen in the context of post World War II history. Whether waving the banner of freedom or waving the banner of human rights, Western leaders have consistently sought to obscure both their motivations and the often-dreadful consequences of their actions. Freedom was never a concern. Nor were human rights, but such rhetorical justifications helped to engage domestic public support for international adventures designed to serve corporate interests. The lure of profit always takes precedence over the lives of millions. Every year, 40 million people die needlessly of hunger and malnutrition, victims of a global capitalist system that cherishes wealth, but human lives not at all. (1) In terms of dead, this silent holocaust is the equivalent of a Second World War - in which 55 million died - taking place every year and a half. Yet a drop in the Stock Market evokes more concern. Such a system is monstrous. One can gauge Western commitment to human rights and justice by examining the record of these self-appointed judges. History is replete with examples, so a few cases will have to serve as a synecdoche.

Slaughter in Indonesia

Mass murder in Indonesia elicited a response from Western leaders. They supported it. A bloody CIA-backed military coup toppled President Sukarno and brought General Suharto to power in 1965. Following the coup, an estimated 500,000 to one million members of the Indonesian Communist Party (PIK), trade unionists, peasants and ethnic Chinese, were killed in one of the most barbaric mass slaughters in history. The U.S. government supplied Suharto with a list of several thousand Indonesian communists it wanted to see eliminated. Researcher Kathy Kadane discovered through interviews with former U.S. embassy personnel that “as many as 5,000 names were furnished to the Army, and the Americans later checked off the names of those who had been killed or captured…” (2) 

As the Indonesian Army hunted down and butchered its victims, U.S. Secretary of State Dean Rusk cabled the embassy in Jakarta that the “campaign against the PKI must continue,” and urged embassy officials to “get across that Indonesia and Army have real friends who are ready to help.” The U.S. Ambassador to Indonesia, Marshall Green, responded to Rusk that “we have made it clear that Embassy and USG [U.S. Government] generally sympathetic with and admiring of what army doing.” (3) 

Unable to keep up with the pace of killing demanded by Washington, the Army organized Muslim extremists and right wing death squads and set them loose in a frenzied killing spree. Indonesian generals asked the U.S. Government for more weapons “to arm Muslim and nationalist youths in central Java for use against the PKI,” and Washington responded quickly with covert shipments of arms. (4) One former State Department official told Kadane, “No one cared as long as they were communists that were being butchered.” (5) An internal CIA report later noted that it was “extremely proud” of its role in the coup. (6) 

As Ambassador Green remarked in a cable to Washington, “Bluntest remark was question of how much is it worth to U.S. that PKI be smashed and trend here reversed, thereby swinging big part of SEA [Southeast Asia] from communism.” (7) Once Suharto formally assumed the post of acting president on March 11, 1966, economic aid was forthcoming and U.S. and Western European advisors helped chart economic policy in New Order Indonesia. By 1967, Indonesia had rejoined the IMF and World Bank, passed an investment law favorable to foreign corporations, and was rewarded with a large increase in U.S. aid, rising to $200 million by 1969. (8) In the years to come, New Order Indonesia would continue to imprison, torture and execute several hundred thousand people. Only in Suharto’s last months in office did Western support for him wane, due to a people’s revolution which threatened to topple him. A shift in the West’s support was imperative in order to ensure a cosmetic change of leadership to protect its interests.

In the Islamic Republic of Iran

In 1983, the CIA supplied a long list of members of the communist Tudeh Party to the Khomeini government in Iran, branding those identified as “Soviet agents.” The expectation was that these people would be arrested and executed, a hope that was not disappointed. The Iranian government sprang into action, arresting hundreds of party members and outlawing the Tudeh Party. Two hundred Tudeh members were executed during the first wave of arrests. More arrests would follow, including the entire party leadership, who were tortured and forced to make false televised confessions. The British government also supplied information on Tudeh to Iranian authorities. Eventually over 10,000 members and supporters of Tudeh would be imprisoned and tortured. (9) In 1989 a specially appointed committee swept through the prisons and sentenced thousands to death. Over 5,000 people from various political parties were executed. (10) The U.S. concern was that a post-Khomeini Iran might move to the left. The Western assisted decimation of Tudeh aimed to forestall that prospect.

Cambodian Cauldron

In 1975, Cambodia fell to the Khmer Rouge; virtually the entire country was turned into a forced labor camp as they implemented a primitive agrarian economy. Over the next four years as many as two million Cambodians perished from starvation, disease and executions. Several hundred thousand people were tortured and murdered. Here was crime against humanity on a grand scale. Following a Khmer Rouge invasion of Vietnam, counter-attacking Vietnamese forces, in conjunction with an uprising of the Cambodian people, drove the Khmer Rouge from power in January 1979. A socialist government led by Hun Sen was established as Cambodia began its long road back to recovery. Khmer Rouge troops, in alliance with right-wing forces, launched a fierce guerrilla war against the new Cambodian government which lasted several years. Prince Norodom Sihanouk and Son Sann joined the Khmer Rouge in forming a Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea, which at Western insistence, represented Cambodia at the United Nations in place of the government of Cambodia. (11) This provided a fig leaf of legitimacy for Western support of a movement dominated by the Khmer Rouge. American and British advisors and arms shipments aided Sihanouk’s and Sann’s forces, which carried out coordinated military operations with Khmer Rouge troops and were often commanded by Khmer Rouge officers. Western arms frequently found their way into Khmer Rouge arsenals as many members of Sihanouk’s and Sann’s organizations belonged to the Khmer Rouge. U.S. officials pressured humanitarian groups to supply food and aid to help sustain the Khmer Rouge.(12) 

After the fall of the Khmer Rouge, Vietnam maintained a troop presence in Cambodia in order to help defend the fledging Hun Sen government and prevent the return to power of mass murderers. American officials were outraged, and spared no effort to reverse the situation. Western sponsored peace negotiations in 1989-1990 succeeded in obtaining the withdrawal of Vietnamese troops. The second goal of Western negotiators was to replace or weaken socialist forces in Cambodia. Under pressure, Cambodia was obliged to bring officials from Son Sann’s and Norodom Sihanouk’s organizations into the government. Cambodia was also compelled to restore the monarchy and place Sihanouk back on the throne. During the peace negotiations, American officials insisted that the Khmer Rouge be given a prominent role in the new governing coalition. (13) As one U.S. negotiator explained, “No Khmer Rouge, no deal.” (14) The Khmer Rouge, fiercely anti-Vietnamese, still harbored dreams of seizing territory from Vietnam. This harmonized with U.S. goals in the region, also fiercely anti-Vietnamese. A Hun Sen government in Cambodia friendly to Vietnam was impermissible. Vietnam had to be isolated, even if it meant risking the return to power of executioners in Cambodia. Only Khmer Rouge intransigence failed to bring about the realization of the Western demand for the inclusion of Khmer Rouge officials in the government. Preferring to continue the guerrilla struggle, the Khmer Rouge hoped to grab sole control of governing reins through force of arms.

As Cambodian government troops closed in on the last remnants of Khmer Rouge forces in March 1998, Khmer Rouge warlord Ta Mok communicated an offer through Thai military channels to turn the Khmer Rouge leader, Pol Pot, over to the United States. Taken by surprise, U.S. officials turned down the offer. (15) No desire for a tribunal here. They didn’t want him. But Cambodia wanted him, so the U.S. had to act to prevent that eventuality. The U.S. needed time to structure proceedings, presumably in order to ensure that the American role in support of Pol Pot would not surface during a trial. While U.S. officials worked on arrangements for a trial on their terms, Pol Pot committed suicide. (16) 

Following the final defeat of the Khmer Rouge, the Cambodian government announced that Khmer Rouge leaders would be tried for crimes against humanity. The U.S. immediately demanded that any trial be conducted solely under United Nations auspices, in other words, under terms dictated by the U.S. After lengthy wrangling, Western threats and pressure forced Cambodia to relent and seek a compromise in which the trials would be conducted in Cambodia, but with a mix of Cambodian and Western prosecutors and judges. A major sticking point is whether the controlling majority will be Cambodian or Western. In response to a hostile letter sent from UN Secretary General Kofi Annan in April 2000, Hun Sen announced that the Khmer Rouge trials would not be limited to the years in which it held power, but would cover the entire period of 1970 to 1999. (17) This touched directly on the worst fears of U.S. officials, spanning events from the CIA-backed military coup in Cambodia in 1970 through the final years of Western support for the Khmer Rouge. Only a hastily drawn American plan for evenly divided prosecution and judicial teams brought an agreement on the trial, ensuring that only the years of Khmer Rouge power would be considered. (18) The Cambodians also had reason to worry. Their justifiable fear was that a prosecution team with a Western majority would seize the opportunity to seek the arrest of Hun Sun and other leaders of the Cambodian People’s Party (CPP) on trumped-up charges. The elimination of the CPP from the scene and the installation of a government more amenable to Western dictate has long been a Western goal. Clearly the U.S. motivation is to steer any trials in a direction favorable to its interests. 

Despite apparent agreement, Western insistence on majority control continues. When Hun Sen announced that a draft law on the conduct of the trial would be passed by August 2001, Kofi Annan fired off a threatening letter, demanding full adherence to all Western demands. Unbowed, Hun Sen responded, “It seems to me that the UN does not want Cambodia to proceed with the trial, so I want Kofi Annan to be careful with the sovereignty and the independence of a nation, and let’s talk straight and be clear with each other. I am afraid of nobody. This is a Cambodian issue. To join us or not is up to you.” (19)

In Yugoslavia

In March 1998, the secessionist Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) was a small force with about 300 members. Turing a blind eye to the KLA’s policy of murder and intimidation, the U.S., Germany and Great Britain sent arms shipments and provided training to the KLA, building it up into a major guerrilla army with as many as 30,000 members. (20) Western intervention turned a small conflict into a major crisis. As a pretext, NATO relied on the crisis it had created in order to justify waging a war of aggression against Yugoslavia. Foremost among crimes against humanity is the crime against peace, and for this crime NATO and Western leaders clearly bear guilt. Every town and city in Yugoslavia was the target of their bombs. My travels throughout Yugoslavia shortly after the war confirmed that NATO deliberately targeted civilians. Entire residential areas were wiped out. Houses, apartment buildings, factories, schools, hospitals, bridges, power plants, offices and a passenger train were destroyed. Cluster bombs, anti-personnel in nature, were dropped on residential areas, tearing human beings to pieces. Over 2,000 civilians were killed and more than 10,000 wounded by NATO. 

Western leaders could not sell the war to their publics by revealing that it was intended to create a market friendly to Western corporate interests, so they concocted the lie of concern for Albanian human rights. When NATO bombs started falling, Serbian extremists became enraged, blaming Albanians for the bombs. Right-wing paramilitary squads formed, venting their rage on Albanian civilians in mainly border areas of Kosovo. Rogue police and criminal gangs, both Serbian and Albanian, took advantage of the chaos to loot homes and drive away occupants. Yugoslav security forces, the target of NATO bombs, struggled to stabilize the situation. By the third week of the war, they were escorting Albanian refugees back to their homes, and within two months order had been restored to most of Kosovo. (21) Yugoslav security forces fought against the terrorism of both the KLA and Serbian paramilitaries, and by the end of the war had arrested over 500 Serbian extremists for crimes against Albanian civilians. (22) 

President Milosevic’s position was consistent. He advocated ethnic equality. His delegation at the Rambouillet peace talks consisted of members of every ethnic group in Kosovo, including Albanian. Serbs were a minority in the Yugoslav delegation. (23) At the talks, the Yugoslav delegation offered wide-ranging autonomy for Kosovo. Repeatedly, Milosevic stated his commitment to a multi-ethnic society. His words from a 1992 speech are typical: “We know that there are many Albanians in Kosovo who do not approve of the separatist policy of their nationalist leaders. They are under pressure, intimidated, and blackmailed, but we shall not respond with the like. We must respond by offering our hand, living with them in equality, and not permitting that a single Albanian child, woman, or man be discriminated against in Kosovo in any way. We must, for the sake of all Serbian citizens, insist on the policy of brotherhood, unity, and ethnic equality in Kosovo. We shall persevere on this policy.” (24) A monumental propaganda campaign has succeeded in achieving one of the most astounding smear campaigns in history, painting a democrat devoted to socialist ideals as a racist hate-monger. 

Milosevic’s offense was his opposition to privatization and foreign control of the Yugoslav economy. The U.S.-organized Balkan Stability Pact called for a region under the sway of the free market model. Yugoslavia, strategically positioned along the Danube and astride a major highway transportation route, stood in the way of the effort to place the Balkans under total Western economic domination. Milosevic points out that Yugoslavia, as “the remaining socialist government threatening capitalist control of Europe,” provided “living proof history had not ended, that more than one economic system was possible.” (25) 

The common thread running through these examples is not a zeal for justice and human rights by the West, but a vindictive urge to seek the imprisonment or murder of its opponents. Nothing can stand in the way of corporate profits. As one man in Yugoslavia told me, “ I think our President Milosevic is more of a problem for imperialism than for us.”


It is an interesting exercise to contrast responses to terrorism. When the KLA assassinated Yugoslav citizens, including Albanian, by the many hundreds, President Milosevic sent security forces to fight the KLA and attempt to restore order. It was his duty to protect his country and his citizens, yet NATO responded by continuing to provide arms, reconnaissance and training to the terrorists. NATO also engaged in terrorism itself by bombing those who opposed terrorism, killing and wounding thousands of innocents in the process. When the US itself suffered terrible losses at the hands of terrorists on September 11, 2001, it responded by bombing Afghanistan. The Al-Qaida network, with cells in 60 countries, remains largely intact. This approach is analogous to battling the Mafia by bombing the entire territory of Italy. Clearly, other interests are being pursued. 

A Taliban-led Afghanistan did not, Minerva-like, instantly spring forth fully-grown. In April 1979, US officials began meeting with Mujahedin guerrillas and asked a Pakistani military official to recommend Mujahedin organizations to receive U.S. support. This was eight months before Soviet intervention on behalf of the Afghan socialist government. (26) According to Zbigniew Brzezinski, National Security Advisor at the time, on July 3, 1979, “President Carter signed the first directive for secret aid to the opponents of the pro-Soviet regime in Kabul.” Brzezinski explained to Carter that in his “opinion this aid was going to induce a Soviet military intervention.” Although the brutality of the Mujahedin was already evident, Brzezinski reflected years later, “That secret operation was an excellent idea. It had the effect of drawing the Russians into the Afghan trap.” (27) The US secret war in Afghanistan escalated under the Reagan Administration, totalling over $2 billion, the largest covert action ever undertaken. (28) The intervention continued long after the withdrawal of Soviet troops, right up until Mujahedin forces captured Kabul three years later, in 1992. Once the socialist government was toppled, U.S. interest faded as Mujahedin warlords fiercely battled each other for supremacy, while thousands died. 

Afghanistan is exactly what the U.S. worked so assiduously to achieve: the most repressive government on the planet, intolerant, misogynist, and murderous. The nature of those the U.S. supported was never a mystery. President Reagan’s favorite Mujahedin leader, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, had first distinguished himself in early days by leading fellow-students at Kabul University in throwing acid in the faces of women who did not wear the veil. (29) Mujahedin troops routinely tortured and mutilated captured Soviet and Afghan government soldiers. American advisors were often present but ignored the cries of those who were savagely tortured. Mujahedin forces frequently burned down schools and murdered teachers for having the temerity to teach women how to read and write. Among those receiving U.S. weapons, training and assistance was Osama bin Laden. (30) They were “freedom fighters” as long as they murdered leftists. They only became terrorists when those they murdered included Americans.

Show Trial

Who can believe that Slobodan Milosevic could possibly receive a fair trial at the hands of the International Criminal Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia (ICTY)? He wasn’t even allowed to speak at his arraignment without having his microphone twice switched off. At his later appearance at a status conference, where issues of concern could be raised, his microphone was again turned off and the judges walked out. At Milosevic’s third appearance before the Tribunal on October 29, 2001, his microphone was once again switched off. Court officials routinely try Milosevic in the press by feeding emotive lies to Western media. Milosevic, however, remains muzzled even outside of the courtroom. Following Milosevic’s brief telephone interview to Fox News, tribunal officials angrily threatened that a repeat would result in the removal of all prison privileges, including the right to mingle with other prisoners and to receive visitors and mail. 

For over one month, the tribunal kept Milosevic in solitary confinement, refusing to allow him to consult with his lawyers. Subsequent planned consultations are often frustrated by the denial of visas for his lawyers or disapproval by the tribunal. Tribunal officials, violating the basic right of confidentiality, generally monitor those consultations that do take place. Cameras spy on Milosevic in his cell, round the clock. Milosevic, who insists on representing himself in court, is denied this right, as well. The tribunal has, over Milosevic’s objections, appointed three amici curiae (friends of the court) to represent him during proceedings. Their task will be to give a false appearance of a fair trial, and prevent Milosevic from challenging the legality of the court and presenting an effective defense. He will be denied say in his own defense. Even the Nazis allowed Bulgarian communist leader Georgi Dimitrov to speak and to conduct his own defense at the Reichstag Fire Trial in 1933.  The ICTY cannot match even the low standard of Nazi justice. 

The tribunal was created at the behest of the United States. It receives funding and direction from its NATO masters. It cannot be an impartial judge of events in the Balkans when it is controlled by the nation most responsible for the region’s tragedy. It was the US that armed and supported secessionist forces, deliberately wrecked peace negotiations in 1992 and 1993, and participated in the wars itself, most notably by its brutal bombing of Yugoslavia in 1999. The court is a servant of a party to the dispute it judges. Geoffrey Locke, a retired British barrister, points out that the tribunal “makes up its own rules of procedure and evidence and is answerable to nobody.” Furthermore, he adds, “the judge is required to call for additional evidence or request modification of the indictment ‘in support of any count.’ This produces the wholly outrageous situation that a judge of the very court which is to try the case is not merely empowered, but positively directed, to act as counsel for the prosecution in the preparation of the case and suggest how it could be bolstered or improved!” (31) 

An ad-hoc tribunal, established to judge events in only one location violates the concept of equality of law. Attempts to create an International Criminal Court, which would have jurisdiction throughout the world, have foundered on the rocks of US insistence on inclusion of a clause exempting US citizens from prosecution. Even the theoretical possibility of a trial for US war crimes must be blocked. In reality, an International Criminal Court would serve the interests of imperialism, just as the ICTY does. Only the victims of Western aggression would be tried. “The United States itself,” Milosevic writes, “immune from control or prosecution and above the law, uses its power to cause the persecution of enemies it selects to terrorize and further demonize.” (32) 

During NATO’s war against Yugoslavia, the Tribunal hastily composed its indictment of Milosevic and four other Yugoslav leaders in order to bolster sagging public support for the war. Created and funded by the same Western powers that carried out NATO’s war, the ICTY serves its master. The trial is widely, and rightly, seen as setting an important precedent. No longer would international law be an impediment to action. Already the war established that Western powers could wage war without authorization by the United Nations. The trial will establish their right to seize anyone without regard to borders or legal niceties. Anyone resisting Western demands would be threatened with abduction and imprisonment. It will be yet another tool for imposing Western domination over other nations, and it will be used. The trial of Slobodan Milosevic will be a show trial with a preordained verdict. 

The real war criminals are not on trial. They act as judge and jury. We are witnessing the outrageous spectacle of criminals judging their victims. President Milosevic’s only crime was that he had the courage to stand up to NATO despite overwhelming odds, to patriotically defend his country against aggression. Shortly after the war, I was a member of a delegation that interviewed Albanian refugees who fled to Belgrade. Among those we interviewed was Fatmir Seholi, Chief Editor at Radio Television Pristina until NATO troops entered Kosovo and expelled him from the province. Unlike those in the West deluded by propaganda, he knew a real war criminal when he saw one. “Every NATO bombing was a big problem,” he told us. “There was no purpose relating to the Serbian nation or the Albanian nation. Whether that was their purpose or not, people were killed. The man who could command NATO to bomb people is not human. He is an animal. After the bombing at Djakovica, I saw decapitated bodies. I have pictures of that. It is horrible, terrible. I saw people without arms, without feet.” Seholi demanded, “Who is Clinton to accuse another? I would like to say to Hillary Clinton that her husband is an immoral person. That man ruined our state for no reason. What would he say if someone bombed the United States, bombed the White House, or killed or raped his daughter? Who is the evil man here? Milosevic, who is protecting the territory of Yugoslavia and protecting the people of Kosovo, or Clinton, who bombs us?” (33)


“Learn About What Works,” www.netaid.org .

Fidel Castro, citing the UN Food and Agriculture Organization’s report to the Club of Rome, “The World Economic and Social Crisis,” Publishing Office of the Council of State (Havana), 1983.

Eva Cheng, citing U.S. President Clinton, “Fake Debt Write-Off: Rich Nations Tighten the Screws,” Green Left Weekly, October 20, 1999.

Kathy Kadane, “Ex-Agents Say CIA Compiled Death Lists for Indonesia,” San Francisco Examiner,

May 20, 1990.

Gabriel Kolko, Confronting the Third World, Pantheon Books (New York), 1988.


Kathy Kadane, “Ex-Agents Say CIA Compiled Death Lists for Indonesia,” San Francisco Examiner, May 20, 1990.

Ralph McGhee, “The Indonesian Massacres and the CIA,” Covert Action Quarterly, Fall 1990.

Op. cit., n. 3

Op. cit., n. 3

Bob Woodward, “CIA Curried Favor with Khomeini, Exiles,” Washington Post, November 19, 1986. M. Ovidar, “A Brief History of the Tudeh Party of Iran,” www.tudehpartyiran.org

Ibid. Statement of the CC of the Tudeh Party of Iran, “Death of Noureddin Kianouri,” November 6, 1999.

Michael Haas, Cambodia, Pol Pot, and the United States: the Faustian Pact, Praeger (New York), 1991. Michael Haas, Genocide by Proxy: Cambodian Pawn on a Superpower Chessboard, Praeger (New York), 1991. Together, Michael Haas’ two books comprise perhaps the most thorough and damning account of Western diplomatic involvement in Cambodia.

Jack Colhoun, “U.S. Supports Khmer Rouge,” Covert Action Quarterly, Summer 1990. David Munro, “Cambodia: A Secret War Continues,” Covert Action Quarterly, Spring 1992. Op. cit., n. 11.

Ben Kiernan, “The Cambodian Crisis, 1990-1992: the UN Plan, the Khmer Rouge, and the State of Cambodia,” Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars, Volume 24, Number 4 (1992). Op. cit., n. 11

John Pilger, “Reseeding the Killing Fields,” The Nation, October 2, 1995.

Press release, “Pol Pot Committed Suicide: Review,” Far Eastern Economic Review, January 20, 1999.


“Hun Sen to Adopt New Formula on KR Trial,” Agence France Presse, April 28, 2000.

“UN, Cambodian PM Agree in Writing on KR Trial Formula,” Agence France Presse, May 24, 2000.

Chris Decherd, “Cambodia PM Rejects UN Demand,” Associated Press, June 29, 2001.

Tom Walker and Aiden Laverty, “CIA Aided Kosovo Guerrilla Army,” Sunday Times (London), March 12, 2000. Tomislav Kresovic, “Numerous U.S. Agents in ‘Humanitarian Missions’,” Politika Ekspres (Belgrade), April 9, 1998. Peter Muench, "Secret Weapons Aid to Kosovo," Sueddeutsche Zeitung (Munich), July 4-5, 1998. “German-KLA Ties,” ARD Television Network (Munich), September 24, 1998.

Paul Watson, “Contradicting NATO, Refugees Say Serbs Steering Many Toward Home,” Los Angeles Times, April 21, 1999. Steven Erlanger, “Milosevic Aide on Kosovo Urges Albanians to Return,” New York Times, May 8, 1999. Jacky Rowland, “The Refugees Who Remained,” BBC News, May 18, 1999. “Pristina’s Cafes Full, Shops Reopening,” Agence France Presse, May 16, 1999. “Life in a Pristina Suburb,” Beta (Belgrade), May 16, 1999. Paul Watson, “In One Village, Albanian Men Are Everywhere,” Los Angeles Times, May 17, 1999.

“Milosevic Defiantly Defends His Role in Kosovo Conflict,” Fox News, August 24, 2001. Milosevic: “There are individual crimes, but there was a clear order that any crime has to be punished immediately, and whoever did it, has to be arrested. And the proof that that order was obeyed…is the fact that more than 500 different individuals were arrested by the police or the army who were doing so.” Interview with Slobodan Milosevic by Arnaud de Borchgrave, “Text of Milosevic Interview with UPI,” UPI, April 30, 1999. Milosevic: “Our regular forces are highly disciplined. The paramilitary forces are a different story.… We have arrested those irregular self-appointed leaders.” Steven Erlanger, “Milosevic Aide on Kosovo Urges Albanians to Return,” New York Times, May 8, 1999. At the time this article appeared, 380 paramilitary criminals had been arrested. The final total exceeded 500.

“Belgrade’s Line-Up for Kosovo Peace Talks,” Reuters, February 5, 1999. Interview with Faik Jasari, Albanian member of the Yugoslav delegation at Rambouillet, by author and members of the North American Solidarity with Yugoslavia Delegation, led by Barry Lituchy, in Belgrade on August 9, 1999.

“President Milosevic Addresses Kosovo Polje Rally,” Radio Belgrade Network broadcast, December 17, 1992.

“Statement of President Slobodan Milosevic on the Illegitimacy of The Hague ‘Tribunal’,” August 30, 2001.

Steve Galster, “Afghanistan: the Making of U.S. Policy, 1973-1990,” National Security Archive, October 9, 2001.

Interview with Zbigniew Brzezinski, Le Nouvel Observateur (Paris), January 15-21, 1998, translated by William Blum.

Steve Coll, “Anatomy of a Victory: CIA’s Covert Afghan War,” Washington Post, July 19, 1992.

Philip Bonosky, “Washington’s Secret War Against Afghanistan,” International Publishers, 1984.

Ahmed Rashid, Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in Central Asia, Yale University Press, 2000. bin Laden: “To counter these atheist Russians, the Saudis chose me as their representative in Afghanistan….I set up my first camp where these volunteers were trained by Pakistani and American officers. The weapons were supplied by the Americans, the money by the Saudis.”

Correspondence forwarded to me, from Geoffrey Locke to Tim Fenton, July 8, 2001.

Op. cit., n. 25.

Interview with Fatmir Seholi, Albanian refugee from Kosovo, by author and members of the North American Solidarity with Yugoslavia Delegation, in Belgrade on August 9, 1999.


Copyright, Greg Elich , 2001. For fair use only.   

The URL of this article is: http://globalresearch.ca/articles/ELI111A.html